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(utility) and Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah (objectives of the Sharīʿah). His 
approach to the interpretation of the Qurʾān (the main source of the 
Sharīʿah) and the implications of such an approach have only rarely 
been heeded. This study addresses this aspect of al-Shāṭibī’s work. It 
essentially asserts that in restructuring Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) 
around the idea of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah, al-Shāṭibī brought jurists and 
Qurʾān commentators closer to one another. It further argues that his 
contribution went beyond the interest of jurists centred on legal reasoning 
by holding a comprehensive hermeneutical view of the Qurʾān informed 
by belief in the thematic unity of its sūrahs and verses. Taking such 
unity as the cornerstone of a sound understanding of the Qurʾān capable 
of grasping its eternal values and universal principles, he developed a 
methodology that has inspired a few eminent contemporary Muslim 
scholars who have developed what has come to be known as thematic 
interpretation of the Qurʾān (al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī). This article discusses 
al-Shāṭibī’s hermeneutics of the Qurʾān by delineating his epistemic and 
methodological propositions. Thus, the author aims to show the existence 
of semantic unity and epistemic interconnectedness among different 
disciplines in Islamic scholarship.
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Abstrak: Penulisan mengenai al-Shatibi bertumpukan kepada pandangan 
beliau mengenai maslahah (utiliti) dan Maqasid al-Shariʿah (objektif-objektif 
Shariʿah). Namun, pendekatan beliau terhadap tafsiran Al-Qur’an (sumber 
utama shariʿah) dan implikasi pendekatan tersebut jarang diambilkira. Justeru 
itu, kajian ini menekankan hasil kerja al-Shatibi. Tesis beliau menegaskan 
bahawa dalam penyusunan semula teori perundangan Islam (uṣūl al-fiqh) 
yang berkaitan dengan idea Maqasid al-Shariʿah, al-Shatibi membawa ulama 
dan pengulas Al-Qur’an lebih rapat antara satu sama lain. Ia selanjutnya 
berpendapat bahawa sumbangan beliau melangkaui kepentingan ulama yang 
bertumpu kepada hujah undang-undang dengan memegang pada pandangan 
hermeneutikal Al-Qur’an yang komprehensif, dimaklumkan oleh kepercayaan 
dalam perpaduan tema surah dan ayat Al-Quran. Dengan mengambil kira 
perpaduan tersebut sebagai asas pemahaman Al-Quran yang mampu menerapkan 
nilai murni serta prinsip-prinsip sejagat, beliau telah membangunkan satu 
metodologi yang mampu memberikan inspirasi kepada beberapa cerdikiawan 
kontemporari Islam yang terkenal, yang telah membentuk tafsiran tema al-
Quran (tafsīr mawḍūʿī). Artikel ini turut membincangkan hermeneutik Al-
Quran oleh Shatibi dengan menggariskan cadangan-cadangan epistemik 
dan metodologi beliau. Oleh itu, tujuan penulis adalah untuk menunjukkan 
kewujudan perpaduan semantik dan perkaitan epistemik antara disiplin yang 
berbeza dalam kesarjanaan Islam.
Kata kunci: takwil tematik, undang-undang hermeneutik, al-Shatibi; objektif 
Shari’ah, teori undang-undang Islam.
The Andalusian Mālikī jurist Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) 
has enjoyed widespread acclaim in modern Islamic intellectual and 
academic circles, especially among scholars and students of Islamic 
jurisprudence concerned with issues of renewal and reform. Many 
works have been produced on a number of different aspects of his 
intellectual legacy, with special focus given to his book al-Muwāfaqāt 
in which he articulated his theory of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah (objectives 
of the Sharīʿah) and legal methodology. Such works have contributed 
considerably to our understanding of al-Shāṭibī’s work and appreciation 
of its place in the development of Islamic thought, notably with regard 
to the crystallization of the idea of maṣlaḥah (utility) and identification 
of the purposes underlying the Sharīʿah injunctions. 
However, one important aspect of far-reaching implications seems 
to have escaped the attention of most of those who wrote on al-Shāṭibī’s 
thought. This aspect concerns his conceptualization and formulation of 
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what he considered as the proper approach for understanding the Qurʾān. 
It is argued in this article that what al-Shāṭibī did in this respect could be 
seen as a precursor to what has come to be known, since the late 1960s, 
as al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī. None of those who studied al-Muwāfaqāt and 
discussed its legal methodology has heeded this important feature. This 
applies to scholars and students of both Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-
fiqh) and Qurʾānic studies and exegesis (tafsīr), including people who 
have produced exegetic works. Perhaps, due to their compartmentalized 
academic preoccupations, the former saw it as an ordinary work of legal 
theory, while the latter did not expect a jurisprudent to offer something 
relevant to their field. 
The earliest attempt to focus on this aspect of al-Shāṭibī’s work 
was that made by Wael B. Hallaq. His interest in it arose as part of 
his study regarding the place of the Qurʾān in al-Shāṭibī’s legal theory 
according to which the Qurʾānic text is viewed “as an integral whole.” 
As he puts it, al-Shāṭibī’s view of the Qurʾānic text in addition to the 
legal hermeneutic and thematic inductive method he suggested for 
understanding it and constructing Sharīʿah universals all effectively 
transcend the boundaries set by scholars of uṣūl. This in turn brought 
him “closer to the doctrine of the exegetes than that of fellow legal 
scholars” (Hallaq, 1991, pp. 71-90). 
Taking up this aspect of al-Shāṭibī’s thought, we shall examine 
his maqāṣid-based legal hermeneutics with special focus on his 
approach to the Qurʾān in order to unearth its epistemic significance 
and methodological implications. Thus, we shall be able to show how 
he paved the way for the modern concept of thematic interpretation of 
the Qurʾān or al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī. Three basic terms therefore need 
to be clarified at the outset. (1) Broadly speaking, legal hermeneutics 
as used in this study refers to the interpretive methods and techniques 
developed in uṣūl al-fiqh whereby the meanings and legal purport of 
relevant Qurʾānic verses and Prophetic sayings are explicated. (2) 
The term Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah refers to the objectives intended to be 
realized by obeying the Lawgiver’s commands as enshrined in the 
Qurʾān and Sunnah (al-Raysuni, 2005; Attia, 2007; Ibn ʿAshur, 2006). 
(3) By al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī, we refer to the interpretation of the Qurʾān 
based on consideration of a specific theme either in one sūrah or 
throughout the whole Qurʾān (al-Daghamin, 2007;  al-Akhras, 2006; 
Kafi, 2004; Rashwani, 2009; Saeed, 1986). This analysis will show that 
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by developing his views on legal Islamic hermeneutics that are in turn 
based on Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah, al-Shāṭibī effected an unprecedented 
confluence between Islamic legal theory and Qurʾān exegesis which 
provided a basic framework for thematic interpretation. 
An Overview of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah before al-Shāṭibī
Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī (d. 365H), the most authoritative Shāfiʿī 
jurist of his time in Transoxiana, wrote Maḥāsin al-Sharīʿah, which is 
thus far the oldest extant work of Islamic jurisprudence which directly 
deals with the subject of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah or the Objectives and 
Intents of Islamic Law. This book does not belong to the category of 
epistemological and methodological works dealing with the sources and 
methods of Islamic jurisprudence under the rubric of uṣūl al-fiqh. Rather, 
it is a work of substantive Islamic law (fiqh) meant to show the wisdom 
and purposes underlying the specific rules of the Sharīʿah in the different 
domains of Islamic legislation, ranging from ritual purity and prayer to 
the judiciary and penalties, and further delving through marriage, the 
family, sales and financial transactions and other topics. At the outset of 
his book, however, al-Shāshī makes a number of important assertions 
that have clear epistemological and methodological implications for 
uṣūl al-fiqh. According to him, the rules of Sharīʿah throughout the 
various domains of life are all rational. Otherwise, they would run 
against wisdom and that which is good and beneficial (al-Shāshī, 2007, 
p. 29). Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992), a philosopher and student 
of al-Shāshī (Kholayfat, 1988), devoted one work to expounding the 
virtues of Islam and the underlying wisdom of its precepts in contrast to 
other religions. For him, one fundamental characteristic of Islam was the 
all-encompassing nature of its teachings from where the magnanimity 
and moderation of its commands can be seen to emanate, thus making 
them suitable to human beings’ original nature (al-ʿĀmirī, 2006, pp. 
37-90). These two scholars can thus be considered as forerunners in the 
systematic study of what later developed into Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah.
The question of the rationality of the Sharīʿah and purposefulness 
of its rules as being enacted for the good and benefit of mankind, 
subsequently, constituted a major topic in the works of legal theorists 
(uṣūliyyūn). As a result of their deliberations on the issue of taʿlīl 
(ratiocination) and the related notion of ʿillah (effective cause or ratio 
decidendi of the Sharīʿah commands) in qiyās (analogical reasoning), 
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the idea of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah emerged; it mainly crystallized through 
the concept of munāsabah (suitability, appropriateness) as one of the 
key methods of discovering the effective causes of Sharīʿah commands 
(El-Mesawi, 2008; Emon, 2010; Hallaq, 1999; Weiss, 2010). It was 
al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) who would provide the first systematic 
articulation of the idea of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in his discussion of the 
levels of rationes legis. 
Al-Juwaynī asserted that the rationes legis underlying the Sharīʿah 
commands consist of five categories reflecting the maṣāliḥ intended 
by those commands. He classified them in descending order according 
to their importance for human life and existence. The first category 
consists of things that are necessary and universal as they concern the 
well-being of the entire society, thus being derived from an intelligible 
fundamental principle. Without them, human society cannot exist. The 
law of retaliation is an example of Sharīʿah rules aimed at protecting 
immune human life. The second category concerns public need (ḥājah 
ʿāmmah). Though it also derives from a general principle relating to 
people in general, a public need does not reach the level of necessity; 
the difference being that if all people abstained from it, the entire 
society would therefore suffer hardship and harm. The third category 
involves neither a universal necessity nor a general need. It consists of 
recommendable things which add ease and beauty to human life. The 
last two categories do not fall under a general rule or specific genre that 
may serve as the basis of analogy (al-Juwaynī, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 602-604; 
al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 602-604; El-Mesawi, 2003; Opwis, 2010). 
Following in the footsteps of al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) 
adopted the abovementioned hierarchical classification of the Sharīʿah 
objectives, though he dropped the 4th and 5th categories from it. He 
enriched it with more analytical details and examples. However, his 
essential contribution lies in the taxonomy he established regarding 
the content of the first category. In his view, the ultimate purpose of 
the Sharīʿah with regard to human beings consists in the realization 
and protection of five necessary things; namely, religion, life, intellect, 
progeny and property. Whatever leads to the preservation and promotion 
of these five things is a maṣlaḥah, and whatever causes the undermining 
or omission thereof is a mafsadah (harm), the removal of which 
constitutes a maṣlaḥah. For al-Ghazālī, these five principal matters are 
universal and constitute the core values of human life throughout all 
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times and climes. Their necessity is such that no community can exist 
without them, nor would there be any legal system which does not care 
for them. Likewise, they are indispensable to human life and society 
and the human socio-ethical order is utterly inconceivable without 
them. As such, their respective protection and promotion occupies a 
primary place in the hierarchical structure of the goals intended by the 
Lawgiver in all domains covered by the Sharīʿah. These core values are 
consolidated and complemented by a gamut of values which constitute 
the following two categories of ḥājiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt and correspond 
with the secondary and complementary needs of human beings (al-
Ghazālī, 1997, vol. 1; El-Mesawi, 2003; Emon, 2010; Opwis, 2010).
This classification of the Sharīʿah objectives according to 
their relative importance in human life and existence has become 
a standard taxonomy accepted by almost all subsequent legal 
theorists (e.g. al-Āmidī, 2003, vol. 2/3; al-Maḥbūbī, 1996, vol. 2; 
al-Qarāfī, 2007; al-Rāzī, 1997, vol. 5; al-Taftazānī ). No essential 
additions or radical modifications to them have been made. The most 
significant development taking place afterwards consisted of further 
epistemological refinement and methodological systematization which 
the history of Islamic jurisprudence attributes to Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī 
(d. 790/1288) of Andalusia. As will be seen below, his al-Muwāfaqāt 
stands as a landmark in the development of Islamic legal hermeneutics 
which paved the way for the contemporary discourse on thematic 
interpretation of the Qurʾān. 
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah as the axis of uṣūl al-fiqh 
In his quest for the ultimate or grand objectives of Islamic teachings, 
al-Shāṭibī based his entire thesis on the primacy of the Qurʾān as “an 
integral whole” (Hallaq, 1991, p. 71). Arguing for his maqāṣid theory 
on the basis of tawātur maʿnawī and thematic inference, he strongly 
emphasized the centrality of the Qurʾān as “the comprehensive ultimate 
source (kullī) of the Sharīʿah, the mainstay of Religion, the wellspring 
of wisdom, and the paradigm of the [Divine] message” (al-Shāṭibī, 
1996, vol. 2, p. 309). Used as a key term in al-Shāṭibī’s discourse, 
tawātur maʿnawī had been mainly developed in the context of Muslim 
jurists’ discussions on the epistemological value of solitary reports 
(akhbār āḥād). They distinguished between tawātur lafẓī in which the 
transmitted āḥād reports have identical wording and tawātur maʿnawī 
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where the āḥād reports, “all having independent chains of transmission, 
possess one theme in common.” Hence, “the knowledge of this theme 
becomes conclusive as well as immediate” (Hallaq, 1990, p. 20). 
From a first reading, al-Shāṭibī’s Muwāfaqāt would appear as 
a work in uṣūl al-fiqh, both in its concern and language. However, 
to regard it as merely so is to underestimate its intellectual and 
methodological significance for the overall development of uṣūl al-fiqh 
and its implications for the study of Islamic scriptural sources. Careful 
attention to the epistemological and methodological premises outlined 
at the beginning of the book and profound analysis of its overall 
structure and the main argument running through it clearly shows 
that it amounts to no less than an entire restructuring of uṣūl al-fiqh, 
with great epistemological and methodological implications not only 
for Islamic jurisprudence, but also for the interpretation of the Qurʾān 
as a whole (al-Raysuni, 2005; Hallaq, 1991). In al-Shāṭibī’s view, the 
main thrust of al-Muwāfaqāt consists of “a theoretical grounding of 
the foundations” of knowledge of the Sharīʿah (al-Jabiri, 1994, p. 548; 
al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, p. 88). He considered his approach as novel 
and original, and advised the reader to shun taqlīd and instead rise to a 
maturity of thought in order to benefit from the book and appreciate its 
message (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, p. 26). The question, therefore, arises 
as to what makes this book unique. 
The arrangement of the topics treated in al-Muwāfaqāt is quite 
telling of its methodological and epistemological orientation. Of its five 
parts, the third and the largest one is devoted to a lengthy discussion and 
analysis of the Sharīʿah objectives, hence its title “Kitāb al-Maqāṣid” 
(Book of the Objectives). Occupying a middle position in the book, 
this part stands as the unifying ring of its parts and provides a detailed 
exposition of the central theme around which its entire argument 
revolves. The discussion of the issues raised in the other parts is geared 
towards clarifying, elaborating and substantiating this central theme. 
Al-Shāṭibī’s work was thus a profound renewal of uṣūl al-fiqh which 
shook its very conceptual and terminological structure, and amounted 
to a kind of “re-founding” of this discipline from a new perspective (al-
Ansari, 2010, pp. 178, 270). 
In the first part, al-Shāṭibī enunciates in thirteen propositions the 
epistemological principles underpinning his reformulation of Islamic 
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legal theory. A major concern overshadowing his discussion in this 
respect is with establishing “certitude as the epistemic foundation 
of the sources of law [fiqh]” (Hallaq, 1999, p. 164). His solution to 
this issue consists of three main components. The first is what he 
refers to as definitive rational principles, while the second consists of 
comprehensive or complete induction of the sources of the Sharīʿah 
(al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, pp. 29-30). As Hallaq (1990, pp. 29-30) 
rightly indicated, this comprehensive thematic inference represents 
“the most advanced stage in a prolonged process of theoretical 
development” and “an extension of al-tawātur al-maʿnawī.” For al-
Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 1, p. 29, 35-36, 70-71), inductive inference in the 
context of the Sharīʿah denotes certainty, and operates as follows. It 
consists of an exhaustive thematic survey and analysis of Sharīʿah 
sources in order to establish universal principles, or simply Sharīʿah 
universals. These universals are similar to mental universals derived 
from the real world of existence and share with them the properties of 
universality, regularity, consistency, certainty, and predominance over 
particulars. 
The third component of al-Shāṭibī’s epistemic foundation for the 
study of the Sharīʿah is a combination of the previous two, while 
equally denoting certainty (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, p. 30; Ibn ʿAshur, 
2006). The importance of the inductive thematic reading of the verses 
of the Qurʾān is to help one uncover their recurring themes, discover the 
eternal values and infer the anchoring universal principles and general 
rules enshrined therein. When a specific theme or principle is found to 
manifest itself repeatedly across a wide spectrum of issues, that theme 
or principle can be known definitively or hold a high probability of 
having a comprehensive bearing on all individual cases to which it is 
relevant (Hallaq, 1991). 
Thus, having laid down the epistemic foundations for the study of 
the Sharīʿah, al-Shāṭibī sets out to expound his understanding of the 
maqāṣid. He starts by advancing an essential theological premise on the 
question of causation and ratiocination with respect to divinely revealed 
laws. For him, these laws emanate from a fundamental existential 
purpose consisting of the realization of the “well-being and good of 
human beings both in this world and in the Hereafter” (al-Shāṭibī, 
1996, vol. 1, pp. 322). In this connection, he takes to task the Ashʿarī-
Shāfiʿī scholar Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) and his likes for their 
FROM LEGAL HERMENEUTICS TO THEMATIC EXEGESIS/ EL-MESAWI        197
negative stand on the matter. That the Sharīʿah is instituted for the benefit 
and well-being of human beings is, for him, unquestionable. This is a 
fact grounded in conclusive inductive inference of its textual sources 
which neither al-Rāzī nor anyone else could contest. The Qurʾān and 
Sunnah, al-Shāṭibī points out, contain countless details that constitute 
compelling evidence on the certainty and truthfulness of this premise, 
thus establishing ratiocination as a general characteristic of the Sharīʿah 
in all its spheres of legislation (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, pp. 322-223; Ibn 
ʿAshur, 2006). 
Like most Sunnī jurists before him, al-Shāṭibī adopted al-Ghazālī’s 
taxonomy of the Sharīʿah objectives (Hallaq, 1999). The Sharīʿah legal 
obligations, he says, “revolve upon the realization and promotion of 
its purposes in the human creation,” and these purposes consist of the 
three “categories of ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt.” Comprising 
the above-mentioned universals (kulliyyāt) of religion, life, mind, 
offspring and property/wealth, the ḍarūriyyāt effectively denote those 
things which are indispensable not only to the proper functioning of the 
religious-spiritual and mundane affairs of human life, but also to the 
very existence of human society. In al-Shāţibī’s view (1996, vol. 1, p. 
324), undermining those universals will lead to corruption and chaos 
in this life and to loss and misery in the hereafter. In order to maintain 
them, the Sharīʿah has followed a two-fold approach: On the one hand, 
it has taken positive and proactive measures to realize and enhance 
them; while on the other hand, it has provided preventive measures to 
protect them in the present and to prevent anything that might affect 
them in the future.
Inculcating the fundamental articles of faith (such as belief in 
the oneness of God) and establishing the essential acts of devotional 
worship (such as prayer) are meant to preserve and promote dīn, while 
instituting the rules governing customary practices (such as taking ḥalāl 
food) aims at the preservation of nafs and ʿaql. Contractual dealings, 
such as marriage and commercial transactions, serve to maintain 
progeny and property as well as life and mind. All these constitute the 
positive aspect of the Sharīʿah’s approach to realizing its objectives and 
promoting its values. The preventive aspect involves matters such as the 
enactment of penalties, the legislation of the law of compensation and 
the institution of the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil (al-
Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, p. 325). 
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Al-Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 1, pp. 36-37) also maintains that the five 
universals constituting the ḍarūrī category are a matter of agreement 
not only among Muslims, but also among other communities. 
Their knowledge is so deeply engrained in the collective mind and 
consciousness of the Muslim community that it amounts to the level of 
necessary knowledge. As mentioned above, this knowledge is grounded 
in a conclusive thematic induction of the sources of Sharīʿah in all 
spheres of legislation excluding any doubt. 
The ḥājī category, al-Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 1, pp. 326-227) explains, 
consists of what is needed to alleviate hardship and bring ease and 
comfort in human life. Without it, people in general would face distress 
and difficulty in their observance of the Sharīʿah law, though this is still 
considerably much less than the harm which results from the disorder 
and corruption affecting the universals. In his opinion, this easing spirit 
which characterizes the Sharīʿah’s approach to human well-being applies 
to all spheres of legislation whether in ritual worship, customary and 
daily life practices, contractual dealings or sanctioning and punishment. 
For example, the exemption from fasting during the month of Ramadan 
in the case of sickness or a long difficult journey clearly reflects this 
spirit. Imposing blood money on the clan or social group of the killer 
aims at alleviating the financial burden of the implicated individual.
Finally, the taḥsīnī category includes all that improves human life 
and makes it comfortable and graceful. Matters belonging to taḥsīniyyāt 
are not necessary in the sense that without them human life effectively 
becomes deficient or the Sharīʿah commands inoperative; rather, their 
role is to improve the quality of life and to make the observance of law 
easier. Ignoring or relinquishing this category is not detrimental to the 
ḍarūriyyāt or ḥājiyyāt, although it concerns the same areas of legislation 
like them (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, p. 327). 
This brief exposition provides a general view of al-Shāţibī’s 
conception of the three categories of maṣlaḥah constituting the Sharīʿah 
objectives in human creation. Nevertheless, it does not do justice to the 
complex structure of his work nor to the sophisticated argument that he 
developed to expound his ideas. As mentioned above, al-Shāţibī’s work 
presents us with a methodological and epistemological restructuring of 
uṣūl al-fiqh. Two major features of this side of his work need to be 
highlighted here in order to unravel some of their implications for the 
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study of Islamic jurisprudence. Al-Shāţibī’s aim, as seen earlier, was 
not to simply add a new chapter to uṣūl al-fiqh under the heading of 
maqāṣid. Rather, the main thrust of his contribution was towards 
making the concept of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah as a central and unifying 
theme guiding his treatment of all components of the discipline; the 
knowledge of which he considered as a necessary condition for ijtihād, 
whether for understanding textual sources or for analogical reasoning 
and rational extrapolation of the general principles of the Sharīʿah to 
new cases and situations (al-Raysuni 2005). For example, in the part of 
the book devoted to the adillah or legal proofs, al-Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 2, 
pp. 6-7) again bases the discussion on the major premise that the main 
purpose of the Sharīʿah is to preserve and promote the three categories 
of ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt underlying its injunctions in all 
spheres of legislation. This, therefore, requires that legal inquiry into 
its sources must not be confined to some of its aspects or particulars. 
Such an inquiry must be comprehensive so as to reflect the inclusive, 
universal and all-encompassing nature of those categories formed on 
the basis of inference from a multitude of particulars (juzʾiyyāt). 
Put differently, since these universals constitute “the foundations of 
the Sharīʿah,” particulars must always be considered in relation to the 
universal to which they belong. Conversely, universals derived from 
Sharīʿah sources cannot exist without the particulars forming them 
(al-Durayni, 2008, vol. 1; al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 7-8). Similar 
to Ibn Taymiyyah, he adopted a nominalist view for which universals 
do not exist as extra-mental entities while only particulars do. Al-
Shāṭibī further upholds that there is a dialectical relationship “between 
the universal and its particulars [dictating] that the setting aside of a 
particular is detrimental to the cognate universal.” The converse of 
this is that “considering a universal while neglecting its constituent 
particulars would undermine that universal” (Hallaq, 1999, p. 167). 
This holistic maqāṣid-based approach to the study of the Sharīʿah 
is clearly reflected in al-Shāṭibī’s (1996, vol. 2, pp. 264-265) discussion 
of the issue of generic grammatical forms in the Qurʾān. In his opinion, 
generic forms are not the only means to denoting a general or universal 
meaning as generally understood by uṣūl al-fiqh scholars. There is an 
equally, and indeed more important method to establishing universal 
meanings. It consists of induction, be it complete or incomplete. Once a 
general or universal meaning is established through inductive inference 
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from multiple particulars, it will be applicable to any particular case 
even if that case is a mere likelihood. This rule, for al-Shāṭibī, is taken 
for granted by scholars of both transmitted and rational sciences. For 
example, removing hardship in the Sharīʿah is not merely based on 
some specific general expressions or generic grammatical forms. Rather, 
it is inferred from multiple instances obtained in a variety of areas in 
Islamic law where the notion of alleviating hardship is clearly taken 
into account. Likewise, we may take for granted that this constitutes a 
universal principle observed by the Sharīʿah in all spheres of legislation. 
However, al-Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 2, pp. 266-667) anticipates that 
the validity of the inductive method for establishing universal truths in 
Sharīʿah-related matters might be questioned on more than one ground. 
Two major objections are of special interest to us here. The first is that 
induction is applicable only to rational concepts and not to legal matters 
for two main reasons: (1) Meanings in the realm of ʿaqliyyāt are simple 
and do not allow for differences and differentiation; as such, the mind 
can apply the same judgement to similar things whether they are seen 
or unseen by virtue of logical necessity. (2) By contrast, the sharʿiyyāt, 
which belong to conventions (waḍʿiyyāt), do not enjoy the same status 
as ʿaqliyyāt which refer to the realities of the realm of existence; as they 
depend for their existence on the mere will of the authority instituting 
them. Likewise, similar things may be “disunited and separated”, that 
is, be given different judgements, while opposites may be united, by 
judging them equally. 
The second objection goes as follows. By virtue of being 
characteristic attributes of particulars, differentiae necessarily imply the 
existence of one or more than one meaning other than that which serves 
as basis for the construction of a universal. Unless there is compelling 
evidence, such differentiae are excluded from the judgement applied 
to all particulars belonging to a universal, and we are in no position 
to admit the validity of sharʿī universals. If such evidence exists, 
the whole exercise of forming universals through thematic induction 
becomes futile, as the notion of ʿumūm would then depend on textual 
proofs. Furthermore, in the Sharīʿah one finds many instances of 
particularization whereby some cases are excluded from the general 
statement under which they were subsumed. Thus, the whole idea of 
forming universals based on particulars collapses (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 
2, pp. 233, 267-268).
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To answer the first objection al-Shāṭibī maintains that from an 
epistemological point of view, there is no difference between sharʿiyyāt 
which depend on convention (waḍʿ) and authority, and ʿaqliyyāt, which 
depend on rational and logical necessity. Both are susceptible to the 
inductive method, and equally allow for the formation of universals. 
This is supported by the established intellectual tradition of the earlier 
generations of Muslim scholars who acquired it from their understanding 
of the spirit and dispositions of the sources of the Sharīʿah. Regarding 
the second objection, he argues that we do not engage in the formation 
of a universal in any case, based on the general meaning shared by 
any multiplicity of particulars; rather, we do so only when we realize 
that differentiae are not considered. Moreover, if differentiae are to be 
considered in absolute terms, then analogical reasoning must be abolished 
as one of the major proofs in Islamic jurisprudence, and we know that 
this is not the case. Differentiae, therefore, do not affect the construction 
of universals on the basis of general meaning shared by particulars (al-
Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, p. 70, vol. 2, p. 269; Jughaym, 2002). 
The primacy and thematic unity of the Qurʾān 
The foregoing discussion was meant to bring into focus the main thrust 
behind al-Shāṭibī’s attempt to reconstruct uṣūl al-fiqh. Thus, for him, 
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah stands as the unifying central theme of Islamic 
legal theory. An important epistemological and methodological aspect 
following from this drive deserves more attention here. It concerns 
the relationship among the sūrahs of the Qurʾān. This is of special 
significance to the main thesis of this article; which mainly asserts 
that al-Shāṭibī was a precursor of the contemporary notion of thematic 
interpretation of the Qurʾān. According to Hallaq (1991, pp. 71-72), al-
Shāṭibī’s view of the Qurʾān transcends the boundaries within which 
it had been confined by the jurists, thus making him “closer to the 
doctrine of the exegetes than that of fellow legal scholars.” Without 
going into a detailed analysis of al-Shāṭibī’s Qurʾānic hermeneutics, 
our brief discussion of his inductive thematic method for inferring 
Sharīʿah universals enables us to realize the overall orientation of that 
hermeneutics. What matters most for us in this study is to see how the 
aforementioned issue has been addressed in al-Muwāfaqāt. 
At the outset of his discussion of the adillah (the Sharīʿah legal-
proof sources), al-Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 2, pp. 36-38, 309) expresses his 
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disinterest in discussing all issues usually discussed by scholars of uṣūl 
al-fiqh, and especially those related to ijmāʿ (juristic consensus) and 
raʾy (exertion of personal opinion in ijtihād), as earlier scholars had 
already dealt with them satisfactorily. He chose instead to expand his 
viewpoint on how the Qurʾān and the Sunnah should be approached 
in a maqāṣid-based legal theory, both in terms of conceptualizing the 
status of each of them and of the methodology required to interpret 
them. In what follows, we shall focus on what he had to say regarding 
the Qurʾān, leaving aside his insights concerning the Sunnah as they lie 
beyond our purpose here. 
To start with, al-Shāṭibī seems to have been as equally uncomfortable 
with the way legal theorists conceived the status of the Qurʾān as a 
source of legal rulings and commands as with the methodology they 
devised for interpreting its verses. In their formulations, the amplitude 
of the Qurʾān had been reduced to a set of legal statements from which 
legal rulings would be derived. This is mostly reflected in their debate 
over the number of the verses with legal import or āyāt aḥkām. Of the 
more than six thousand verses of the Qurʾān barely five hundred are 
considered as āyāt aḥkām, the knowledge of which is required for the 
jurist. Moreover, only verses revealed in Madīnah are to be included 
in this category. This is for the perceived reason that it was during the 
Madīnan period that the Qurʾān began legislating on practical matters 
and laying down rules and laws to regulate individual and collective 
life (abu Zahrah, 1997; al-Ghazālī, 1997, vol. 2; al-Khudari, 1983). 
This might imply that the rest of the Qurʾānic verses are irrelevant to 
the enterprise of the jurist, or at least have no direct bearing on legal 
inquiry. Thus, an atomistic approach to the Qurʾān may be said to have 
permeated uṣūl al-fiqh (Shams al-Din, 1999). 
To rectify this situation, al-Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 2, pp. 309, 331-332, 
335) emphasizes the Qurʾān as “the absolute and all-inclusive source of 
the Sharīʿah, the mainstay of the Muslim community, the wellspring of 
wisdom, the paradigm of the message [of Islam], etc.” Accordingly, he 
insists that it is incumbent upon anyone seeking to know the universal 
foundations (kulliyyāt) of the Sharīʿah and aspiring to understand its 
intentions and associate oneself with its people to take it as his “intimate 
companion day and night”. This is because the abovementioned 
Sharīʿah universals have been emphasized in the Qurʾān in the most 
perfect manner. He further argues that no single issue would occur that 
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cannot be traced back to a general rule or a universal principle laid down 
in the Qurʾān. 
Al-Shāṭibī’s (1996, vol. 1, pp. 368-371, 414-434) strong emphasis 
on the completeness, self-sufficiency and comprehensiveness of the 
Qurʾān is only paralleled by his emphasis on the manner in which the 
relationship between its verses should be perceived. For him, the proper 
way to comprehend the Qurʾānic discourse is to approach its verses in 
their chronological sequence and interrelatedness as an integral whole. 
Madīnan revelations must be seen as a continuation and elaboration of 
Makkan ones. Similarly, later revelations in each category must be seen 
as confirmation, prolongation or elaboration of those preceding them. 
According to al-Shāṭibī’s analysis, there is within the Qurʾān a thematic 
continuity and unity which flows, generally speaking, according to 
the chronological order of revelations from the most fundamental and 
universal to the most particular and less fundamental. Confining legal 
inquiry to āyāt al-aḥkām, which are exclusively Madīnan revelations, 
would simply mean losing sight of the foundations and universals of 
the Sharīʿah laid down in the Makkan revelations. To illustrate how the 
thematic continuity and interrelatedness in the Qurʾān is manifested, he 
examined (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 369-370, 375-381; Hallaq, 1991, 
1999) the two long sūrahs of al-Anʿām (Cattle) and al-Baqarah (Cow). 
As a Makkan revelation, the first sūrah laid down the foundations 
of faith and belief; and it was on this basis that Muslim theologians 
worked out their thought systems, beginning with the affirmation 
of the existence of the Necessary Being to the issue of imāmah or 
political rule. According to al-Shāṭibī, when we examine it closely by 
following his suggested approach, we will realize that it also provides 
the foundations and universal principles of the Sharīʿah understood 
as a comprehensive code of life. Likewise, it enunciates essential 
commandments pertaining to ascribing divinity to none other than God, 
the sanctity of human life and economic property, goodness to parents, 
protection of children, observing justice and equity in economic and 
social dealings, in addition to avoiding shameful deeds whether openly 
or secretly. All these are laid out in the context of an exposition of the 
Qurʾānic view of the universe as well as of human history and the place 
of Revelation and prophethood in it. Undermining or ignoring one of 
those principles and foundations may result in damage to the entire 
Islamic legal system or at least the demolition of one of its universals. 
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Besides confirming the universal values and overarching principles 
established in the sūrah of the Cattle relating to the preservation of 
religion, life, intellect, progeny and property, the sūrah of the Cow, 
one of the earliest Madīnan revelations, provides details pertaining to 
the different forms of human acts, including things such as devotional 
rituals, diet, marriage, commercial transactions and crime. Accordingly, 
what was revealed in Madīnah subsequent to this sūrah must be seen 
in its light, just as what was revealed in Makkah after the sūrah of the 
Cattle must be viewed in the light of the latter. This, al-Shāţibī insists, 
is a general phenomenon characterizing the entirety of the verses of the 
Qurʾān in their interrelatedness. Any attempt at a proper understanding 
of God’s Word must take this fact as the guiding truth in Qurʾān exegesis. 
Besides developing a coherent methodology for the understanding 
of the Qurʾān, al-Shāṭibī’s hermeneutic views as analyzed above also 
aimed at overcoming two conflicting positions towards the textual 
sources of the Sharīʿah. On the one hand, among the mystics one 
found the extremist view of the Bāṭinīs advocating esoteric knowledge 
acquired through mystic visions and inspirations which transgressed 
the canons of reason and violated the established rules of language. 
For them, the way to knowing the Lawgiver’s intent lies beyond the 
linguistic structure of Revelation. This position violates the rational and 
linguistic norms of understanding and communication. It amounted to 
merely following one’s vagaries being superimposed on the Qurʾān. On 
the other hand, the Ẓāhirīs confined the means to knowing that intent 
to the literal level and apparent meaning of the Qurʾānic text, therefore 
rejecting any attempt at discovering the inner meanings and deeper 
purposes underlying the Sharīʿah commands and reflecting its sublime 
values (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 546-566, vol. 1, pp. 666-667). Both 
positions, al-Shāṭibī explains, are inimical to a sound understanding of 
the Sharīʿah. They “stand opposite to reasonable, moderate, and middle-
of-the-road interpretations” (Hallaq, 1991, p. 75). In this balanced 
approach, “the Sharīʿah runs in a consistent, systematic manner allowing 
for no discrepancy or contradiction;” likewise, all kinds of violation of 
the text and its deeper meanings are avoided (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, 
pp. 667-673). 
Two principles seem to inform al-Shāṭibī’s methodology for 
understanding the Qurʾān (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 372, 381). The 
first is that “discourse is not meant for mere comprehension of its words 
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(ʿibārah), but for grasping what is expressed and intended [by it]”. 
Words and expressions are just means to realizing the intent or purpose 
of discourse. This is a fact that every sound-minded person must behold. 
The second principle is that the real meanings of many verses in the 
Qurʾān may not be truly understood except through reference to other 
verses. In other words, Qurʾānic verses “depend on one another for their 
understanding” because the Qurʾān constitutes “one single coherent 
discourse.” Hence, the dictum, “the Qurʾān explicates the Qurʾān” (al-
Farahi, 2008; al-Qaradawi, 2000; Ibn Taymiyyah, 1992). 
One important goal sought by al-Shāṭibī in basing his study of the 
Sharīʿah on inductive inference was to attain certainty in establishing 
the universal objectives and anchoring principles embodying its 
eternal values. It follows that once something has been found to 
constitute part of those objectives and principles, such a thing would 
not be subject to abrogation whatever the circumstances might be. 
This is for the reason that abrogation does not occur in the universal 
rules of the ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt. Likewise, all that 
leads to the preservation and enhancement of the five universal 
necessities is grounded in conclusive evidence deriving from 
thematic inference that denotes certainty. Yet, this does not exclude 
abrogation in some particulars of those universals. Abrogation of 
such particulars, though, itself occurs as another way to preserving 
the universals. It would be absurd, al-Shāṭibī believes, if abrogation 
occurs to the Sharīʿah universals since they are considered to be 
“observed in every religious community, even though the ways of 
preserving them might be different from one community to another” 
(al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, 109). To further support this point, al-
Shāṭibī invokes the following two verses: 
In matters of dīn, He has ordained for you that which He had 
enjoined upon Noah – and which We gave thee [Muhammad] 
insight through revelation – as well as that which We had 
enjoined upon Abraham, and Moses, and Jesus: Steadfastly 
uphold the [true] faith, and do not break up your unity therein 
(Qurʾān, 42:13).
And now, although the unbelievers may choose to deny these 
truths (i.e. the manifestations of God’s oneness and of the 
revelation of His will through the prophets), [know that] 
We have entrusted them to people who will never refuse to 
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acknowledge them – to those who God has guided. Follow 
then their guidance (Qurʾān, 6:89-90). 
The first verse refers to common universal truths, which all God’s 
messengers have conveyed to mankind through the different revelations 
entrusted to them. The term “dīn” in it refers to “religion in its generic 
sense”, including Islam and all revealed religions which came before it. 
As for the commonality or sameness of such religions, it pertains to their 
identity in “the fundamentals of faith as regards the necessary attributes 
of God and the principles of the Law as pertaining to the universals of 
legislation. Most important in this is the oneness of God, and the things 
following it, especially the five necessary universals and the ḥājiyyāt, 
without which the human order would be unable to stand upright and 
function properly.” With its purpose being to describe the originality 
and uprightness of Islam, the verse may be understood to mean that God 
has ordained for mankind “The original religion with which He sent 
Noah in the old times, Muhammad in later times, and those in between” 
(Asad, 2011; Ibn ʿAshur, 1997, vol. 12/25, pp. 50-51). 
The second verse concludes a detailed exposition of the careers of 
God’s messengers prior to Prophet Muhammad, such as Noah, Abraham, 
Joseph, Moses and Jesus (Qurʾān, 6:74-90). Their guidance –which 
Muhammad was enjoined to follow– thereby consists of what pertains 
to “the fundamentals of the laws (uṣūl al-sharāʾiʿ) as well as purification 
of the self and good morality.” Hence, the guidance referred to in the 
verse concerns the fundamentals of religious faith and foundations of 
ethics and legislation on which different laws concur (Ibn ʿAshur, 1997, 
vol. 4/7, p. 357). Emphasizing the unchanging sameness of the spiritual 
and moral principles underlying all revealed religions, these and other 
similar verses refer “to the ecumenical unity of all religions based on 
belief in the One God, notwithstanding all the differences with regard to 
the specific statutes and practices enjoined for the benefit of the various 
communities in accordance with their [time-bound] conditions” (Asad, 
2011, pp. 885-886). 
Al-Shāṭibī’s argument on the non-abrogation of the Sharīʿah 
universals does not simply depend upon thematic inference from the 
textual sources of Revelation. Rather, it also rests on the history of 
human thought and experience. That is, since the Sharīʿah contemplates 
the good and well-being of humanity, it is characteristic of Islamic 
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legislation to be concerned about emphasizing meanings that are 
intelligible to the human mind by highlighting the causes and wise 
purposes behind its commands, especially in customary affairs of life. 
This is by virture of the fact that the consideration of rational meanings 
was widespread among humans even during times when no Divine 
revelation was available; thus rational and thinking people “relied 
on it for attaining human well-being and benefits.” In so doing, they 
applied the universal meanings of those maṣāliḥ in such a way that 
they generally led to the desired results, notwithstanding the fact that 
they were defective in many details. The Sharīʿah then was revealed to 
rectify the situation and to perfect the realization of human well-being 
in such a way that its details would run according to “their established 
fundamental principles” (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 1, pp. 590-59, 352-353). 
Likewise, the Sharīʿah values are in essence “something innate within 
humans, and so, universal across denominational lines” (Reinhart, 
2005, p. 5); hence, the congruence of Qurʾānic commands with man’s 
capacity not only to know good from evil, but also to perceive matters 
and distinguish between them accordingly. 
The cognitive certainty and existential universality of the 
ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt whose meanings permeate all the 
domains and textual sources of the Sharīʿah do not however imply that 
they operate in mechanical and deterministic ways that are blind to real 
situations. In fact, exceptions to general rules do occur in the Sharīʿah. 
That is to say, “since the Lawgiver’s intent is to subject human beings 
to general rules, and since customary matters in God’s Norm flow in 
accordance with what is predominant rather than what is all-inclusive, 
and because the Sharīʿah has been instituted according to such norms, 
what should then be observed is to apply universal rules in accordance 
with what is customary and normal rather than perfect and all-inclusive 
universality.” As an example, Divine obligations on human beings are 
linked to reaching the age of puberty, taking it as the indicator of their 
attaining sound rational discrimination, which is the basis of obligation 
in the Sharīʿah. Some individuals, however, may attain the stage of 
rational discrimination before physical puberty, while others may be 
weak-minded and lacking in rational discrimination even though they 
have transgressed the age of puberty. Such instances, however, do not 
undermine the universal rule (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 5-7, 236-
237). 
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From al-Shāṭibī’s thematic induction to Draz’s thematic tafsīr
As far back as the early 1930s, Muhammad A. Draz, an Azharite 
teacher, was busy pondering the best way to approach the Qurʾān in 
his tafsīr classes (Draz, 1993, pp. 7-10). A new methodology, he felt, 
was needed if a proper understanding and effective appreciation of its 
message was to be attained, without necessarily breaking with scholarly 
traditions of the forefathers. Mainly concerned with the style and modes 
of expression of the Qurʾān in conveying its message thus constituting 
its “linguistic miracle,” Draz (1993, pp. 80-142) came to the conclusion 
that the unity of discourse and coherence of argument were prominent 
features of the Qurʾān. As he clearly acknowledges, the way for this 
discovery had been paved by some insightful scholars who examined its 
sūrahs and verses in an integrated holistic manner, and it was al-Shāṭibī 
who thus articulated it by asserting that:
Many and numerous may be the issues addressed in a sūrah. 
It remains, nevertheless, a single whole linking its beginning 
with its end, having an overall objective to which all its parts 
relate in the same way as sentences expressing a single idea 
are interrelated. Anyone who wishes to study the structure 
of a sūrah must begin by looking at it as a single whole, just 
as they must look at the whole idea before considering its 
details (al-Shāṭibī, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 375-376; Draz, 1993, p. 
109). 
Pointing out that al-Shāṭibī had applied the methodological approach 
implied by the above dictum to sūrat al-Muʾminūn (the Believers), Draz 
(1993, p. 109, 142, 144) observes that students of the Qurʾān are gravely 
mistaken “when looking at the partial (or immediate) links between two or 
more adjacent issues, without considering the overall system that applies 
to the whole sūrah.” In order to appreciate the richness of the style of the 
Qurʾān and discover its wealth of meaning, one should take the “unity of 
each sūrah” as an essential tool in that search. By considering its style 
over a whole sūrah, which may include different topics, with different 
passages revealed on different occasions and varying circumstances, “we 
will find the consistency of style and the unity of subject matter at their most 
wonderful.” This derives from the fact that despite its characteristically 
clear sense of word economy, the Qurʾānic discourse maintains “perfect 
coherence of all its constituent elements and the firm bonding of all its 
parts which make of it a single unit that cannot be split up.” 
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To demonstrate the validity and usefulness of the unity-of-sūrah 
thesis, Draz (1993, pp. 163-210; El-Mesawi, 2005) undertook to 
analyze sūrat al-Baqarah (The Cow), the longest chapter in the Qurʾān, 
following nearly the same steps al-Shāṭibī (1996, vol. 2, pp. 377-381) 
had followed in respect of sūrat al-Muʾminūn. One of his main reasons 
for choosing sūrat al-Baqarah was that there was a possibility to 
discover in it incoherence or discrepancy of style in the narrative due to 
the variety and large number of topics it covers and the long span of time 
over which it was revealed. Careful examination, however, revealed it 
to be “a coherent structure built of main purposes that are rooted in an 
elaborate system laying down every aspect [of the topics addressed in 
the sūrah], giving it its sections and branches which are then further 
divided into long and short subdivisions” (Draz, 1993, p. 155). 
Much like al-Shāṭibī, thematic unity of the sūrah was for Draz only a 
prelude to a more holistic approach to the Qurʾān as a whole on the basis 
of handling special topics by examining all relevant material throughout 
its different chapters, thus shunning the atomistic, piecemeal method 
which could only lead to inadequate grasp of its meanings. However, 
they differed on the criteria to be employed in this enterprise. While al-
Shāṭibī chose the chronological sequence of revelations as the basis for 
his thematic analysis, Draz (1983, pp. xv-xvi, xxiii) took the “logical 
unity” and “coherent structure” of the topics or themes to be studied 
as his criterion, a concern which was later expressed by Baqir al-Sadr 
(1990) and Fazlur Rahman (2009). For this purpose, he set out to study 
the moral teachings of the Qurʾān as a “unified system” linking together 
the fundamental moral truths expounded throughout its chapters and 
verses in an attempt to circumscribe the Qurʾānic ethical theory by 
analytically tracing out its meta-ethical or philosophical foundations, 
its conceptual framework and its practical manifestations (Draz, 1983, 
p. xxiii). 
For Draz, the thematic approach to interpreting the Qurʾān serves an 
intellectual and epistemological purpose, namely, that of understanding 
its teachings on its own terms by not subjecting them to preconceived 
or pre-existing models, while however endeavouring not to fall into 
dogmatic self-enclosure, that would prevent comparison and engagement. 
Such an enterprise was required to meet the intellectual and cultural need 
of bringing the Qurʾānic perspective to the attention and conscience 
of humanity, from which “the history of moral doctrines will gain 
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much in terms of scope, profundity and harmony.” Thus, it would 
enable moral thought “to overcome its old and new difficulties” by 
providing greater understanding of the human condition and laying 
the foundation for an enhanced humanism (humanisme élargi) so 
that people of good “will extend their hands for the greater good of 
humanity” (Draz, 1983, pp. xii-xiii, xxv). 
 That being the vision which guided Draz in terms of both 
methodology and purpose, what has been said is deemed sufficient to 
prove the main thesis that al-Shāṭibī not only paved the way for thematic 
exegesis, but also inspired at least one of its pioneers in modern times 
whose contributions have set a model for subsequent scholars, such as 
Muhammad al-Ghazali (2000) and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Kassār, 
1996). It is nonetheless certain that further studies are needed to assess 
whether the accumulated literature on tafsīr mawḍūʿī over the last six 
decades has resulted in a qualitative breakthrough, effectively laying the 
ground for what Fazlur Rahman aspired for, namely, a Qurʾān-inspired 
“Islamic intellectualism” (Rahman, 1982, p. 1). 
Conclusion
The central thesis of this article revolves around the epistemological and 
methodological reform which al-Shāṭibī undertook with respect to uṣūl 
al-fiqh. As we have elaborated, his approach went beyond making mere 
technical changes to redefine certain terms and concepts throughout 
the complex structure of this discipline or to widen their scope and 
refine their meaning. Moreover, he did not content himself with the 
mere rearranging of materials constituting it, according to new criteria. 
Nor did he perceive his task as simply adding new terminology or new 
subjects for discussion. His reform was a complete restructuring of uṣūl 
al-fiqh from a new epistemological and methodological perspective in 
which Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah constituted not only the unifying theme 
of its topics and propositions, but also the overwhelming spirit which 
permeates it throughout and reshapes its entire structure. 
Although he attached considerable importance to language and 
linguistic considerations in understanding the Qurʾānic discourse, he 
strove to free those considerations from what may be described as the 
mechanical use thereof, especially by means of his untiring insistence 
on the intents of the Lawgiver. These intents, as we have seen in our 
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discussion of his view of the place of the Qurʾān and the methodology 
needed for its interpretation, may be known only on the basis of a 
holistic approach to its verses and chapters that transcends the atomistic 
treatment of it by jurists and exegetes alike. 
Building on his Andalusian predecessor, Draz embraced the thematic 
approach to the interpretation of the Qurʾān from within the field of tafsīr 
and Qurʾānic studies. His work and influence have yet to be critically 
assessed in light of the intellectual and cultural developments that have 
taken place in Muslim life, especially in the world of academia.
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